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Abstract 
We test the effect of advice on the well known top trading cycles (TTC) 
matching algorithm in a school choice frame work. We compare three 
treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), 
and both right and wrong advice (RW)] to a no-advice baseline (B). In line 
with previous literature the truth telling rate is higher than 80% in the baseline, 
but it becomes as low as 35% in the W treatment. Truth telling rates are also 
significantly lower in R than in B, and much lower in RW than in B. This 
evidence suggests that a vast majority of participants in our experiment were 
confused. Truth telling seems to work only as a default strategy, and 
participants can be heavily influenced by advice. The real life implementation 
of matching mechanisms may have been misguided by some laboratory 
experimentation. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of matching mechanisms for market design is one of the most successful real world 
applications of microeconomic theory.  Matching mechanisms are currently used for markets 
such as medical schools for graduates (Roth 1984; Roth and Peranson 1999), housing for 
students (Chen and Sönmez 2002; Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez 2003), school choice 
(Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak et al. 2005a; Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak et al. 2005b; Pathak 2011), and 
kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez et al. 2004).   
The proper matching mechanism can ensure that, in theory, final allocations will have 
such desirable properties as stability, and/or Pareto efficiency.  Mechanisms can also be 
strategy-proof; that is, truthful preference revelation is the dominant strategy.  Strategy-proof 
matching mechanisms are often preferred because they don’t punish participants for not 
strategising correctly or, in order words, not finding the optimal way of lying. 
Many experimental studies have found high rates of truthful revelation in strategy-
proof mechanisms (between 70-95%1
2011
). It has been claimed that, if it weren’t for a minority of 
confused participants who manipulate their rankings, truthful revelation would be universal 
(Chen and Sönmez, 2006). These results have been used as the rationale for applying such 
mechanisms to the field, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006b). In a similar vein, Pathak and Sönmez 
( ) goes as far as suggesting that rankings in a strategy-proof mechanism can be used as 
“preference data” representing the quality of schools. 
However, it may be the case that truth-tellers in laboratory experiments are not 
truthful because they understand the mechanism’s strategy-proofness, but perhaps because 
they are just restating their induced preferences. Behaving in such a way does not require 
                                                          
1 Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (2009); Pais and Pintér (2008); Pais, Pintér, and Vesteg (2011) 
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much thinking. If participants do not understand strategy-proofness, preference reporting 
could be influenced by previously ignored environmental factors such as third party advice.   
We run a one-shot, between subjects individual decision making matching experiment 
with a school choice frame.  Participants were informed about markets being formed by only 
a human (themselves) and three payoff maximising computer players. Each experimental 
subject participated in just one of four treatments: a baseline and three advice treatments.  
The Baseline received no advice.  The three advice treatments received the Right advice 
(truthful revelation), Wrong advice (manipulation), and mixed advice (both Right and 
Wrong) respectively.  At the start of the experiment participants were given a detailed 
description of the TTC algorithm which included a solved example.  Then they were asked to 
use TTC to solve an incentive based allocation problem. After finishing this task, participants 
were informed of their valuations for four schools, given the advice, and asked to submit a 
preference order. Each recommended action in the advice treatment, coming from a third 
party source, was accompanied by basic reasoning.  Finally, a questionnaire was used to 
further investigate the understanding of the mechanism’s strategy-proofness. 
  In line with previous research, participants reported their preferences truthfully 73% 
of the time in the baseline. Truthful preference revelation was significantly lower in all the 
advice treatments: 50% in R, 28% in W and 42% in RW. 
Evidence of confusion in matching markets can be found in some matching 
experiments in which participants are given the option to enter the market and refuse to do so, 
even when entering the market has no potential downside,  see for instance Chen and Sönmez 
(2002) and Guillen and Kesten (2010). A recent paper, Hugh-Jones et al. (2013), shows high 
confusion rates among participants facing the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism. More 
generally, the experimental literature is full of examples of seemingly irrational behaviour. 
Relatively simple games in which participants choose to play non-dominant strategies include 
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the dictator game (Engel 2011), the ultimatum game (Oosterbeek, Sloof et al. 2004), the 
centipede game (Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2009), auction games (Kagel and Levin 1986) or 
public good games (Andreoni 1995).  Yet, in most of these games it is often hard to 
disentangle social preferences from irrationality and confusion. Ferraro and Vossler (2010) 
managed to do so by using computer opponents. We followed the same design philosophy.  
 Our experiment shows that people are indeed highly influenced by advice and 
therefore must be unable to verify or assess the property of strategy-proofness for themselves. 
Our result suggests that we cannot expect agents in matching markets to act as if they were 
rational.  This result may have important repercussions for the implementation of centralised 
matching markets. That is, more emphasis should be placed on encouraging and facilitating 
truthful preference revelation. This experiment opens multiple avenues for further research 
into decision making in matching markets. 
 
2. A note on advice 
If the description of the mechanism is unavailable, difficult to find, or too cryptic, many 
participants will be forced to base their decision on either intuition or some kind of advice.  
Despite the importance of advice in the field context, it has been so far almost ignored in the 
laboratory, an exception being Braun et al. (2011).  In the context of school choice, advice 
from the establishment will commonly recommend a truthful revelation strategy.  
The Boston Public School system adopted the strategy proof deferred acceptance (DA) 
algorithm in the mid -noughties following the suggestion of a group of experts lead by 2012 
Nobel Laureate Alvin Roth, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2005). DA replaced the old non-strategy 
proof Boston algorithm (BOS). Savvy parents learnt how to manipulate BOS and pass their 
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knowledge to their peers. Not-so-savvy parents were penalised by the BOS algorithm if they 
naively submitted their true preference order.2
The Boston Public School website contains advice about truthful revelation, but it is 
not easy to find. On top of that, there used to be workshops in which parents received detailed 
explanations about the workings of the mechanisms.  There is some anecdotic evidence these 
forms of advice might have been unsuccessful.  For instance, The Boston Globe, a well 
regarded local newspaper, ran a series of articles criticising the system mainly because parents 
were not satisfied with the possibility of their children attending schools far from their 
homes.
  
3
“A formula so complicated that only the most sophisticated parents understand it, the plan 
combines parental choice, the luck of the lottery, and a built-in preference to keep siblings 
together.” – Boston Globe (2007) 
 Nonetheless the matching mechanism itself was also accused of being cumbersome, 
essentially random, and hard to understand: 
Further than that, some popular blogs contain evidence of parents misunderstanding strategy- 
proofness. We did not find any blog reply clarifying that the mechanism cannot be 
manipulated.  
“I love this school so much, but I can’t bring myself to put it in my top three (You get put on 
the wait list for your top three schools.). I can’t see wasting a wait list spot like that, no 
matter how much I love a school. Strategy-wise, if you’re intent on sending your child to the 
Manning at K1, you almost have to put it as your #1 choice to have a shot at getting in. I 
already have one Hail Mary school in my top 3, so I have to be practical about this. Sadly, the 
Manning will likely be choice #4 for us.” – Geeky Mama (2010) 
                                                          
2 DA is going to be replaced in 2014 by yet a new algorithm that guarantees a school of similar quality to the 
ones in the neighbourhood. 
3 That has to do also with the history of forced busing coming back from the ‘70s. 
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“The Kilmer has a ratio of 6.41 applicants per seat. The Lydon is 6.50. The ratio is a little 
better for other popular schools like the Beethoven, but they still have 4 applicants per seat. I 
just don’t see how most people are getting their first or second choice with numbers like 
these.” – googiebaba (2009) 
In a context in which many parents do not understand the matching algorithm and many 
distrusted and hated the system, manipulation may have been more than likely. A recent and 
pertinent example of the implementation of TTC is the OneApp enrolment solution for 
students and public schools employed in the Recovery School District of New Orleans, USA. 
Information about how to submit preferences was limited.  Correct advice was found online at 
NOLA.com, the local newspaper, Vanacore (2012), which cites the authority of the 
mechanism designers: 
 “The experts who developed the algorithm -folks from Duke, Harvard and MIT- say there is 
no way to game the system. If what you really want is a seat at KIPP Renaissance High 
School, you should not rank Sci. Academy first, thinking that you're more likely to get your 
second choice. Ranking KIPP as your top choice gives you your best shot at getting in.”4
 We did not find any statement regarding truthful revelation, or condemning preference 
manipulation, is present on the Recovery School District website, or the OneApp form.  
Finding this information would require the participants to engage in personal research.  As a 
gauge of interest and available effort, an informative video linked in a Louisiana Department 
of Education press release, totalled only 100 views after the first application of TTC was 
 
                                                          
4 Vanacore, A. (2012). "Centralized enrollment in Recovery School District gets first tryout."   Retrieved 
01/10/2012, from http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2012/04/centralized_enrollment_in_reco.html. 
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.  Likewise the New York City department of education does not contain any advice 
about truthful revelation for their High School deferred acceptance admission system. 
3. Experimental procedures and design 
The experiment consists of 4 sessions run over 2 days, run in the experimental Behavioural 
Research Laboratory at the University of Sydney.  Each session involved an average of 27 
participants.  In each session participants were randomly allocated to a treatment group via a 
card draw.  Participants were recruited using the School of Economics' Online Recruitment 
System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE).  The participants were students of the 
University of Sydney, primarily aged 18-25.  The experiment program was coded by the 
authors using the z-Tree, Fischbacher (2007). 
Participants were given 10 minutes to read the experimental instructions.6
The quiz was an allocation problem with 6 students and 3 schools with 2 places each.  
The participants were given 10 minutes to find the correct allocation. Feedback was not given 
until the end of the experiment. 
  They were 
able to progress at their own pace for the rest of the experiment.  Participants had to complete 
an incentive based quiz, solving a TTC allocation problem.  Then they were informed about 
their house values, given advice if in one of the advice treatments, and asked to submit their 
preference order.  Finally, participants answered a questionnaire about their involvement in 
the task and their understanding of TTC. 
                                                          
5 Recovery School District (2012). "RSD Enrollment (English).wmv."   Retrieved October 30, 2012, from 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnfGNs34Gf0/> 
6 The instructions were modelled on the instructions used by Pais and Pinter (2008) and are included in 
Appendix A. 
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The school environment in the student allocation task consisted of 4 districts, each 
containing a school.  The districts were populated by the participant (denoted by H) and 3 
“profit maximising” computer players (denoted by 1, 2 and 3).  Each school has only one 
vacancy, but school districts B and D are congested (see table 1). The manipulation strategy is 
clear; switching schools B and D in the reported preferences is consistent both with District 
School Bias (DSB) and Small School Bias (SSB), Chen and Sönmez (2006).  
Table 1: School values and local students 
 Value ($) Local Students 
School A 10  
School B 20 1,2 
School C 5  
School D 15 H,3 
  
 The stakes for the allocation task are comparable to previous experiments including 
Chen and Sönmez (2006), Pais and Pintér (2008), Pais et al. (2011), and Calsamiglia et al. 
(2009).  Participants were informed which school they were allocated immediately after the 
task and before the questionnaire.   
Participants in each session were randomly assigned to one of 4 groups:  In the 
[B]aseline they received no advice; in the [R]ight advice treatment they received correct 
advice - to report their true preference ranking; in the [W]rong advice treatment they were 
given incorrect advice - to over-report their preference for their local school; in the "mixed" 
treatment [RW] they received both these pieces of competing advice.  In the mixed treatment 
the ordering of the two pieces of advice was randomised to avoid a primacy effect.  Each 
piece of advice consisted of a recommended action and some simple reasoning.  For ease of 
comprehension and to maintain consistency between treatments the advice was limited to two 
sentences. 
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To avoid experimental demand effects, the advice was presented as third party and 
without endorsement.  The advice was prefaced with the following disclaimer: 
“The following is an example of advice about school allocation procedures which may be 
found in a newspaper or by word of mouth.  It has been stylized to fit the context of this 
experiment.  It is only here for you to consider and is not an instruction”7
Right Advice 
 
“The mechanism is designed so that truthful reporting maximizes your chances of getting 
favoured schools. You should rank the schools in order of their true value to you.” 
Wrong Advice 
“Since the top schools will have many applicants you should be realistic and apply to schools 
where you are likely to gain acceptance.  If your local school is quite good you should put it 
as your first preference.”8
 Advice was given as part of the information package about the specific matching 
environment. Placing it on the same screen devalued its importance and even gave 
participants the chance to ignore it (5 participants reported not reading the advice). 
 
The questionnaire served three main purposes: to ascertain the participants’ use of the 
advice, to question the participants’ understanding of the mechanism, and to determine any 
unintended side effects of exposure to advice on participants’ feelings and beliefs.   
Participants were not rewarded for their answers to these questions so one could 
object to the answers’ validity.  However, this is standard procedure in experimental work. 
                                                          
7 pluralised for the mixed treatment 
8 The wrong advice is noticeably more intuitive than the correct advice.  This is ultimately a fault of the 
mechanism’s complexity rather than the experimental design.  Strategy-proofness is a complex and hard to 
explain in just two lines.  On the other hand, avoiding congestion at popular schools can be easily explained. In 
any case fully rational individuals should disregard advice.  
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The questions crucial to the experimental hypotheses are discussed below.  
Additionally, participants were asked questions about their feelings of involvement and 
satisfaction.  However, no conclusions could be made from these items.  A summary of 
questionnaire responses is included in the Appendix.   
 
4. Results 
Table 2 presents the reported first preference of participants in each treatment group.  School 
B was the ‘correct’ or ‘truthful’ first preference.  Of those who revealed their true first 
preference only 4 participants deviated amongst their other rankings.   
Table 2: Reported First Preference by Treatment Group. 
 Reported First Preference 
Advice group School A School B School C School D Total 
Baseline 0 21 0 5 26 
Right 1 14 1 12 28 
Wrong 0 10 0 19 29 
Mixed 0 11 0 15 26 
Total 1 56 1 51 109 
 
 In the baseline participants reported their first preference truthfully 81% of the time.  
This is comparable to measurements from previous studies.  However, in each advice 
treatment manipulation is higher by a large and significant amount.  The proportion of truthful 
revelation (for the whole ranking, not just the first preference) is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Truthful revelation by Treatment Group with SE bars 
 
Table 3: Two-group tests of proportions for truthful revelation between Treatment Groups (z-score, 
SE in brackets). 
 
Baseline Right Wrong Mixed 
Baseline 
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(0.13) 
0.455*** 
(0.14) 
0.308** 
(0.14) 
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-0.231* 
 (0.13) 
 
 
0.224* 
(0.13) 
0.077 
(0.14) 
Wrong 
 
-0.455*** 
(0.14) 
-0.224* 
 (0.13) 
 
 
-0.147 
(0.13) 
Mixed 
 
-0.308** 
(0.14) 
-0.077 
(0.14) 
0.147 
(0.13) 
 
 
***Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
 z-Tests of proportions indicate that all treatment groups differ significantly from the 
baseline, jointly (p < 0.01) and individually (see Table 3). Participants were also significantly 
more likely to tell the truth in the Right advice treatment when compared to the Wrong advice 
treatment.  Truthful revelation in the mixed advice treatment did not differ significantly from 
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 Most participants managed to find the right answer for the incentive based quiz, but 
we found no correlation between being able to solve the quiz and reporting the true preference 
order. 
We found even further evidence of confusion.  Most of the truth tellers who did not 
get into a good school made it clear in the questionnaires that they would be willing to 
manipulate their preference order if they had a chance to play the game again, see tables 4 and 
5.  Moreover, and also according to the questionnaire, a majority of participants in the advice 
treatments would have adjusted their strategy if given the computer players’ preferences, see 
table 6.  This included a large proportion of participants who told the truth. 
Table 4: Participants' response to the “Reconsider” question arranged by treatment group 
 
Manipulated Truth 
Treatment Group Stay Reconsider % Reconsider Stay Reconsider % Reconsider 
Baseline 3 2 0.40 15 6 0.29 
Right 4 6 0.60 5 2 0.29 
Wrong 12 7 0.37 8 2 0.20 
Mixed 10 5 0.33 7 3 0.30 
Total 29 20 0.41 35 13 0.27 
 
Table 5: Participants' response to the "Reconsider" question arranged by school value obtained 
  Manipulated Truth 
School Value Stay Reconsider % Reconsider Stay Reconsider % Reconsider 
20 13 3 0.19 19 1 0.05 
15 12 9 0.43 12 7 0.37 
10 4 8 0.67 4 4 0.50 
5 2 2 0.50 0 9 1.00 
Total 31 22 0.42 35 21 0.38 
 
Table 6: Participants' response to the "PC Preferences" question arranged by treatment group 
 Manipulated Truth 
Treatment Group Stay Change % Change Stay Change % Change 
Baseline 4 1 0.20 14 7 0.33 
Right  1 9 0.90 4 3 0.43 
Wrong 6 13 0.68 2 8 0.80 
Mixed 3 12 0.80 5 5 0.50 
Total 14 35 0.71 25 23 0.48 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
TTC is a considerably complex mechanism.  Its lack of transparency may be critical factor 
facilitating truthful revelation in our baseline treatment and previous laboratory experiments.  
This relation with complexity may invert when advice is introduced if the mechanism's 
intricacy makes correct advice difficult to believe.  Although TTC is a complex mechanism, 
the designed environment of this experiment's matching market was intentionally made as 
simple as possible.  The school environments in real applications of matching algorithms are 
considerably more extensive.  It is not clear how the complexity of the environment could 
relate to truthful revelation rates.  Gino and Moore (2007) point out that complexity would 
increase participants’ reliance on advice.  This provides a course for further research. Other 
experiments have shown that participants are less likely to follow bad (non-optimal) advice 
(Croson and Marks 2001; Cason and Sharma 2006; Duffy and Feltovich 2010).  In fact, in 
Duffy and Feltovich (2010) most participants quickly learnt not to follow bad advice.  It needs 
to be noted that there were no opportunities to learn in our experiments, as it was a realistic 
one shot design. Since a lottery is used to break priority ties, learning would have been 
difficult in a repeated game design. It is not a coincidence the bloggers write about the 
“Boston Public School Lottery.” 
 One could also assert that truthful revelation in matching experiments is encouraged 
by the low stakes.  Participants may have seen truthful revelation as a “gamble” for the 
highest valued school.  This is confirmed by the dissatisfaction shown by participants who 
received their local school even after ranking it as their highest preference.  These participants 
often reported that they would reconsider their strategy, and in open questions some stated 
they should have tried to get the highest valued school.  It is quite likely that a proportion of 
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truth-tellers are in fact just gamblers.  This could be investigated in a further experiment by 
raising the payoffs considerably, or modifying the differential between school values.  It 
needs to be notes that the payoffs in our experiment are consistent with the experimental 
literature. Another alternative hypothesis is that giving the participants advice implies 
experimental manipulation.  Participants may be discouraged to tell the truth since replicating 
the given order may seem too simple to warrant experimentation.  In any case, the ability to 
understand the mechanism’s strategy-proofness should have negated any of these alternative 
explanations for our main result.   
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